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INTRODUCTION
There has been a substantial increase in institutional trading during the
last decade paralleled by an increase in block trading (i.e., trades of
10,000 shares or more). Because of the impact of block trades on the specialist
there has been concern regarding the effects of block trades on trading liquidity
and stock price volatility (1,4,5,8,11,12,21]. This concern has prompted
several studies on the impact of block trades on the price volatility of
individual stocks. These studies will be discussed in a subsequent section.
The current study is a macro- analysis of this question—does an increase in the
proportion of block trades to aggregate volume result in an increase in
aggregate price volatility?
Following a discussion of the reasoning behind the contention that block
trades will increase stock price volatility, there is a consideration of prior
studies dealing with the impact of block trades on stock price movements.
Subsequently there is an analysis of the relationship between the proportion of-
total NYSE volume accounted for by block trades, and several alternative
measures of stock price volatility. Finally, because prior studies have in-
dicated the influence of interest rate volatility and total trading volume
there is a consideration of these variables.
*The author acknowledges the data on block trades generously provided by
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith. Also the data processing help of Joe
Michand and the use of the computer facilities at the University of Wyoming.
**Professor of Finance, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

GENERAL REASONING
Several studies have clearly demon trated an increase in institutional
trading over the past decade {1,5,8,13,16,17,20]. The data indicated that
the average shares per sale more than doubled from 1961 through 1973; and the
percentage of blocks traded as a proportion of total volume increased from 3.1
percent in 1965 to 18.5 percent in 1972. In addition public trading by individuals
and institutions' reversed themselves fron 1952 to 1971— institutions initially
represented 30.8 percent of public volume, but their share increased to 62.4 per-
cent in 1971.
A special report in Business Week [13 documented this growth trend when
they observed that the institutions percent in public volume has grown to over
70 percent in 1973. This figure exceeds Freund and Minor's predicted figure
of 66 percent in 1972 and associates closely with their 1980 prediction of
72 percent [6], The general trend and long-run outlook is also confirmed by
Soldofsky [203, in spite of the temporary slowdown during 1974 [21].
The increase in institutional trading especially in the area of trading
large blocks, has created a different atmosphere on Wall Street (2,5,8,19].
The floor specialist, whose formal duty is the maintenance of a fair and orderly
market, has traditionally made markets for trades involving a maximum of a few
thousand shares. Recently, most specialists have not been able to provide large
block traders with the desired liquidity because they lacked capital, they were
unwilling to take risks, or because rules restricted their solicitation of
orders [4,11,223. Therefore, institutions began looking toward the Third Market
to provide liquidity and lower commission rates on block trades. The Exchanges
subsequently were directed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to provide
lower minimum commissions for block trades. Meanwhile, block trading houses

emerged with communications networks for providing institutions with liquidity
while still utilizing the talents of specialists in positioning blocks [22].
^The question then arises as to whether or not stock exchange systems are
capable of providing liquidity for large block transactions. An examination
of the non-empirical literature indicates that most observers doubt the ability
of the current market to provide the liquidity required by large blocks (1,4,
11,12].
Generally, the literature indicates that block trades, especially when
liquidity is desired, will usually result in some price reductions with signifi-
cant declines when information is conveyed by the trade [9,10]. If price
declines are not due to information conveyed, then block trades create problems
for individual investors and for corporations.
Much of the literature on the effects of block trading on stock price
volatility indicates that large blocks are initiating changes on Wall Street
and that stock prices are influenced by large blocks regardless of whether
information is conveyed. If liquidity is demanded, then price fluctuations
can and will occur. However, these pri^r studies considered specific instances
rather than generalized empirical investigations. The following section
discusses studies on the effects of blocks traded on stock price movements.
PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON
BLOCK TRADES AND STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY
Effect of Secondary Offerings
Myron Scholes [17] studied the question of potential price volatility
associated with large block secondary sales and derived three hypotheses of
possible effects of large block transactions on stock prices:

1. The substitution hypothesis--prices should not change as a result
of a large transaction because shaTes are not unique.
2. The price pressure hypothesis- -the market can absorb small trades
but prices will adjust for larger blocks to compensate for the
increased effort and inducement required to consummate the
transaction. Depending upon the relative size of the trade, the
price will react and recover shortly after.
3. The information hypothesis --the party initiating the block trade has
some unique information and, therefore, one should anticipate a
price adjustment which will be relatively permanent, reflecting the
new information and the equilibrium price.
Scholes employed a large number of secondary distributions which occurred
between July, 1961 and December, 1965, in which an investment banker acquired
a block and sold the shares after trading hours. He examined the residuals
around the time of the trade by applying the Sharpe Market Model [18). An
abnormal performance index (API) isolated the return above or below the market
achieved by owning securities which e? serienced secondaries.
A decline in the API on the trading day supported the price pressure
hypothesis but, since there was no price recovery, a better explanation of the
results might be the information Hypothesis. Also, there was no relationship
between the size of the block and the prediction error on the trading date.
Further support for the information hypothesis was derived from an analysis of
the API for differences in the seller. These results showed that sales by
corporate officers and investment companies resulted in the largest declines.
The notion that the price adjustment took place at the point of information

was further supported by an analysis of registered and unregistered secondary
trades. Overall, the results were contrary to the price pressure hypothesis
and supported a combination of the information and substitution theories.
Effect of Block Trades
Kraus and Stoll [9] also studied price volatility resulting from institu-
tional trades by examining about 7,000 block trades on the NYSE in excess of
$1 million from July, 1968 to September, 1969. The hypotheses tested included
an information effect in which price would be expected to change if the
variables affecting values changed and a distribution effect which called for
a price change to induce participation and to compensate the intermediaries
for services. The authors hypothesized that minus tick trades were initiated
by sellers; plus tick trades were initiated by buyers; and zero tick trades
were caused by a need to bring the speci list's book to the block price.
Some price recovery by the day's close for minus tick trades was interpreted
as partially supporting the distribution theory. For plus tick trades, there
was virtually no price declines until the close. This finding was viewed as
consistent with the information hypothesis and with the distribution hypothesis.
Block traders usually do not sell short to aid buyers, and, therefore, they
require less compensation relative to seller- initiated trades. When daily
prices around a block trade were adjusted for the market effect, the results
showed a permanent change which is consistent with the information hypothesis.
A test by Kraus and Stoll of the relationship between price impact and
size indicated a significant relationship, contrary to Scholes' results.
However, Kraus and Stoll acknowledged that because big blocks may simply prompt
more institutional study, the results may not have actually supported the

distribution hypothesis. They also pointed out that the differences in
conclusions may stem from the mechanics by which the two blocks were moved.
Notably, both studies concurred that no major increase in price volatility
was evident following block trades . Rather, prices changed in one direction
and subsequently traced a stable pattern relative to the market.
A subsequent study by Nielsen and Joehnk [14} examined price changes
surrounding block trades and hypothesized that the price changes would differ
depending on the market environment (i.e., rising or falling markets). Their
results indicated some slight liquidity costs for the trades, but no significant
differences in price changes for alternative market environments. In terms of
the current study, it is notable that all the price changes after the block
trade were significantly smaller than the price change that accompanied the
trade (i.e., the change from the pre-block price to the trade pTice) . Vfhile
there was some small liquidity effect, the major influence apparently was an
information effect.
Finally, a recent study by Grier and Albin [7] examined price changes
immediately surrounding a block trade in search of non-random price changes.
Their analysis of reversals versus continuations for trades immediately after
a block trade and 15 minutes after the block trade indicated a much higher
proportion of reversals than in normal trading. This non- random price pattern
is consistent with other studies that have always found reversals from the
trade price to the close on the day of the trade. The authors attempted to
use this information to develop a profitable trading rule. They found that
they could make money on 10 percent of the trades (the highest decile of trades
based upon price changes before the trade) , assuming that they could buy at the

trade price and that they could determine which trades experienced the
greatest price changes from the open to the trade before the block trade.
Their final test is of greatest concern to the current study because it
directly tested the effect of a block trade on the price volatility of the
stocks involved. A negative coefficient for the block trade dummy variable
indicated that block trades had a dampening effect on price variability .
Analysis of Parallel Block Transactions
The potential price impact of secondary distributions and block trades
prompted an investigation into the possible disruptive force of institutions.
Kraus and Stoll [10] questioned whether institutions tended to act in concert
—
an activity termed "parallel trading." If all securities are not perfect
substitutes and expectations differ, the intensity on one side of the trade
could cause a price impact.
Parallel trading due to chance was estimated by two separate simulations.
The percent net imbalance was calculated for each month for each institution.
The analysis of parallel trading alone found a substantial imbalance per stock-
month. The comparison of the actual activity with the simulated results disclosed
greater than chance parallel trading by banks and investment companies in large
NYSE stocks. However, since these two groups were on opposite sides of the
market
, their combined parallel trading was less than expected by chance. An
examination of the effect on individual stocks when parallel trading occurred
indicated a price impact. But a test of serial correlation indicated that the
price impact was quickly reversed.

8Summary of Individual Block Trade Studies
The several studies of stock price movements surrounding individual block
transactions would not lead one to expect an overall increase in stock price
volatility because of block trades. Specifically, the Scholes, Kraus-Stoll and
Nielsen-Joehnk studies indicated that the typical price pattern surrounding a
block transaction was a significant price change on the block transaction, a
subsequent small reversal by the close, and insignificant price changes there-
after. Such results indicate a large information effect, a small liquidity
cost, and generally random price changes. Those results might be interpreted
as symptomatic of an efficient capital market in which prices adjust rapidly
to new information and the adjustment is fulfilled in the block trade. In
contrast, those who feel that block trades cause major liquidity problems
would expect a major reversal after the trade as a reflection of the significant
liquidity costs. These results indicating no increase in volatility were
confirmed by the Kraus-Stoll study on parallel trading which indicated that
institutions tended to trade on opposite sides of the market and that there was
actually less parallel trading than one would expect. The final confirmation
came from the Grier-Albin study which found that block trades have a dampening
effect on the price variability of individual stocks.
Therefore, one could hypothesize from these findings that an increase
in the proportion of block trades should not cause an increase in stock price
volatility. The reasoning is simply that block trades are the ultimate
liquidity problem caused by institutional trading since they provide the maximum
pressure on the market system. If this "ultimate' 1 pressure does not cause an
increase in volatility for the stocks directly involved, it is difficult to

envision why all stocks should become more volatile because of such trades.
One might even speculate that if institutions provide liquidity for one another
(as indicated by Kraus and Stoll) , stock price volatility would be reduced (as
indicated by Grier and Albin)
.
Aggregate Stock Price Volatility
In addition to the studies on individual stock price volatility, three
studies have examined aggregate stock price volatility over time. Fisher and
Lorie [3] studied the variability of returns on common stock for the period of
1926 through 1965. Though they were not primarily concerned with changes in
stock price volatility over time, Table 5 of their study contained various
measures of variability which indicated that stock prices were substantially
less variable during the period 1945- 1965 > than during the period 1926-1945.
Unfortunately, their study terminated in 1965 when the institutional impact
was gathering momentum.
A subsequent study by Robert Officer [15] analyzed moving averages of the
variance in stock price returns from 1897 to 1969 and related stock price
variance to selected economic variables. A major finding was that the decline
in variability noted by Fisher and Lorie was not a secular decline but rather,
a return to the normal variability that existed before the 1930-38 period.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, the imposition of margin requirements,
and the composition of stocks did not explain the change in variability over time.
Officer also tested the explanatory power of industrial production, wholesale
prices, new orders, and the M2 money supply and concluded that stock price
variability could best be explained by the variability of industrial production
as a surrogate for business fluctuation.
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Finally, a study by Reilly and Drzycimski [16] specifically examined
changes in daily stock price volatility during the 14 year period, 1960-73
when the change in the market environment was taking place. The analysis
indicated that daily stock price changes had become significantly more volatile
in the recent period but monthly stock price changes were not significantly
more volatile. The authors analyzed the relationship between changes in stock
price volatility and changes in volatility for a number of economic variables
one would expect to influence stock price movements such as earnings, dividends,
industrial production, money supply, interest rates, and consumer and wholesale
prices. An analysis of the individual series indicated that there had been
an increase in interest rate volatility that far exceeded the increase in stock
price volatility. In addition, the correlation of moving variances among the
alternative economic series and stock prices indicated that stock price
variance was most highly correlated with interest rate variance. Therefore,
it was concluded that, although there was an increase in stock price volatility,
the increase could easily be explained by the very substantial increase in
interest rate volatility during the period.
In summary, while the results indicate an increase in stock price volatility,
there is certainly no direct evidence that the increase is attributable to
institutional trading or specifically to block trades. In contrast, the
evidence for individual issues would indicate no such increase.
THE CURRENT STUDY
As noted in the introduction, the current study analyzes the question
whether institutional trading contributes to an increase in stock price volatility

11
as contended by Wall Street folklore. Both the efficient market hypothesis and
prior empirical evidence would argue against such a relationship. Specifically,
in an efficient market with rational profit maximizing investors, one would
expect stock prices to react only to the introduction of new information and the
price adjustment should be rather swift. There is no reason one should expect
more new information to be coming to the market simply because institutions are
doing more of the trading, so this would argue for no change in price volatility.
If one were to argue that institutions are better investors, this would imply
that prices would adjust faster to new information, but the number of price
changes and the magnitude of price changes should not be affected. Therefore,
the efficient market hypothesis would not support the contention of a more
volatile market with an increase in institutional trading.
In addition, most prior empirical evidence likewise would not support such
a contention. Specifically, the several studies of the price effects of block
trades have generally supported the information hypothesis. These results would
argue that because of block trades stock prices may be adjusting faster than
before, but they are not necessarily more volatile. The Reilly-Drzycimski
results indicated a secular increase in stock price volatility that could be
explained by the increase in interest rate volatility.
The Hypothesis
Based upon the foregoing it is hypothesized that there is not a significant
relationship between institutional trading (as measured by the percent of block
trades) and stock price volatility. Further, because of the Reilly-Drzycimski
results, one might expect interest rate volatility to be a superior explanatory
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variable. Finally, some might expect a significant relationship between
absolute trading volume and price volatility irrespective of institutional
activity.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study examines monthly and daily measures of stock price volatility,
percentage of block trading, trade volume in millions of shares, and measures
of interest rate volatility for the period between November 10, 1971 and July
14, 1974. Data were taken from weekly issues of Barron's and Standards and
Poor's Trade and Securities Statistics . The data on block trades were provided
by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.
Daily stock price volatility was measured in the following ways:
1) close on day zero minus close on day -1 as a percent of close on day -1
(close t-close t-1/close t-1); 2) high minus low as a percent of low (high-low/
low); and 3) daily stock price close on day zero minus open on day zero as a
percent of open on day zero (close t~open t/open t) . These various measures
will hereafter be referred to as: clos^/close (Cl-Cl), high/ low (Hi-Lo), and
open/close (Op-Cl), stock price volatility, respectively.
Monthly interest rate volatility measures employed were: 1} percent
change in average interest rate figures during a month for long-term government
bonds (AIRV), 2) high yield minus low yield as a percent of the low yield
(high- low/ low (IRV), and 3) percent change in average interest rate during the
last week in each month (MIRV)
.
Block percentage and trade volume figures were obtained on a daily basis.
Monthly figures are an average of daily figures.
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Bivariate regression analyses of monthly data considered two measures of
stock price volatility (close/close and high/low) as dependent variables in
comparison to block percentage, trade volume, and the three measures of interest
I
rate variability. The multivariate regression analyses compared these two
measures of stock price volatility with block percentage, aggregate block
shares trades, interest rate volatility, and trade volume in a stepwise fashion.
Similar analyses were made for daily data with the third measure of stock
price volatility considered (close/open). It was not possible to include
interest rate volatility for daily data,
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
A complete summary of statistics on individual variables, such as mean
values, standard deviations and coefficients of variation, is shown for daily
and monthly data in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Results of the regression
analyses between daily variables are shown in Tables 3 and 4, while results
using monthly data are contained in Tables 5, 6, and 7,
Descriptive Staeistics
The figures in Table 1 for the daily data indicate that the Cl-Cl variable
was the most volatile of the stock price measures in terms of the coefficient of
variation and the straight standard deviation. As one would expect, the absolute
value measures were always less volatile, The absolute value measures were
employed because it is not clear how important the sign is in this study--!. e.»
whether the price change is positive or negative is not as important as the size
of the change.
The close to open measure of stock price volatility was not considered
because it would almost be identical to the close to close measure.
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The percent of block trade figures (PBV) varied from below 10 percent
to over 20 percent and averaged about 16.5 percent, The PBV was beginning to
climb at the end of the study period to about the mean value. The relative
volatility of the series was fairly large given the range and indicated the
presence of positive skewness. Total trading volume averaged almost 16 million
shares a day and likewise was fairly volatile during this period.
The statistics for the monthly data were consistent with the daily figures
except less volatile as one might expect because of the averaging process.
The IRV figure that was not available daily indicated an average 2 percent
spread during the period and also a fair amount of volatility in this spread--
i.e., a CV of .80 is large for a series that cannot become negative.
Daily Bivariate Correlations
The daily bivariate correlations between the several measures of stock
price volatility, block trading volume and total trading volume are contained
in Table 3.
.
The results definitely do not support the belief that an increase
in institutional trading in tho form of block trades is correlated with an
increase in stock price volatility. Only two of the correlations between stock
price volatility and PBV were positive but these were insignificant, while the
largest correlation was minus .213 indicating that a higher than average per-
cent of block trades was associated with a lower than average spread between
the high and low stock price for the day. These negative results were con-
sistent with the moving average PBV correlations—all of these were negative
with the strongest association with the hi-lo price volatility measure.
In contrast, there was support for the contention that overall trading volume
has an effect on stock price volatility. In this regard, all the correlations

IS
were positive indicating that stock prices become more volatile with higher
trading volume.
The final line that contains the correlations between block trading and
total volume indicates virtually no relationship between the two variables
and any relationship that does exist is negative. This would indicate that
as overall volume increased during this period* there was not an increase in
the proportion of block trading. If anything, the proportion of block trading
declined below average.
Multivariate Daily Results
The multivariate regression results that related alternative measures of
daily stock price volatility to block trading volume and total trading volume
are contained in Table 4. The best results in terms of the correlation co-
efficient was the Hi-Lo variable that had an R of .4. Notably, the first
variable to enter was MAPBV, the coefficient was highly significant but
negative . The second variable to enter was overall trading volume and the
coefficient was significant and positive. The PBV variable entered third,
but the coefficient was insignificant and negative.
The rest of the results can be summarized as indicating that the total
volume variable always entered either first or second and always was very
significant, and positive. The PBV variable entered either second or third,
was usually positive but was never significant at the .05 level. Finally, the
MAPBV variable entered either first or third, always had a negative coefficient,
and was significant in three of five cases.
These results indicate that total trading volume is the most important
variable and that the relationship is positive as implied by the bivariate
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results. The PBV variable has a positive relationship, but it is not statistically
significant. Finally, the MAPBV variable is likewise fairly significant, but
the relationship is not consistent with the expectations of those who hypothesize
that block trading increases volatility. These results indicate that during a
period of generally high block trading, there is a lower level of stock price
volatility.
Monthly Bivariate Correlations
The bivariate correlations between the three measures of monthly stock price
volatility and the measures of block trades, total trading volume and alternative
measures of interest rate volatility are contained in Table 5. The correlations
between the measures of stock price volatility and PBV were all negative and the
Hi-Lo correlation was significant at the .05 level. The relationship between
stock price volatility and total block trading volume (TBV) was mixed. The
two Cl-Cl variables and TBV were positive but not significant, while the Hi-Lo
and TBV correlation was negative. All the correlations with TTV were positive
but not significant at the .05 level.
The correlations among stock price volatility and interest rate volatility
were likewise inconclusive. The two largest correlations were negative and
almost significant, while all other correlations were positive, but not significant.
In summary, the bivariate correlations with monthly data definitely support
the hypothesis that there is not a positive correlation between stock price
volatility and the proportion of block trading because all correlations were
negative. The relationship between stock price volatility and total block
volume was inconclusive with offsetting relationships. The results continued to
support the notion of a positive relationship between stock price volatility and
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TTV. Finally, the relationship with interest rate volatility was mixed with the
strongest results indicating a negative relation, while the majority of cor-
relations indicated a positive relationship.
Monthly Multivariate Results
The multivariate correlation results that related the alternative stock
price volatility variables to percent block volume, total trading volume and
alternative interest rate volatility variables are contained in Table 6. The
results between the stock price volatility variables and the PBV variable
continued to support the hypothesis that there is not a positive relation
between the two variables. The only statistically significant relationships
were between the Hi-Lo variable and PBV and all of these were negative . The
few positive coefficients were quite insignificant.
The relationship between the stock price volatility variables and the
TTV variable varied depending on the stock price variable used. For either
Cl-Cl or Abs Cl-Cl the coefficients were positive but none were statistically
significant. With the Hi-Lo variables the coefficients were generally negative
but very insignificant. Apparently the inclusion of the PBV variable in the
model had a definite impact on these coefficients.
Finally, the majority of the coefficients for the interest rate volatility
variables were positive but not significant.. The two cases where the coefficients
were negative the t-value was larger but still not significant at the .05 level.
Table 7 contains the results for similar multivariate models except the
block trading variable employed is total block volume (TBV) rather than the
percent of block volume (PBV) . The results were virtually the same except for
the TTV coefficients. In these correlations even when the TBV coefficients
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were negative and significant, the TTV coefficients remained positive and
were almost significant.
In summary, the multivariate correlation results using monthly data
likewise supported the hypothesis of no positive relation between block trading
(either as a percent or in the aggregate) and stock price volatility. In
fact, the results continue to point toward a strong negative relationship, which
is completely at odds with the prevailing folklore. There is also continuing
evidence of a positive relation between stock price volatility and total trading
volume especially in the models that employed TBV. The interest rate volatility
results were mixed with the majority of coefficients being positive but very
insignificant and some being negative and insignificant.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
Along with the general increase in trading by institutions in the stock
market during the last decade has been an increase in the amount and proportion
of block trades. The increase in block trades has caused many observers to
expect that such an increase has led to an increase in stock price volatility.
The purpose of this study has been to test this contention directly by examining
the relationship between block trades on the NYSE and stock price volatility on
the Exchange.
A discussion of several past empirical studies that examined the impact of
individual block trades and aggregate stock price volatility led to the hypothesis
that there should not be a relationship between block trades and stock price
volatility. It was pointed out that some observers have felt that total trading
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volume may have an impact on price volatility and a prior study had also
pointed toward the influence of interest rate volatility as a factor. There-
fore, both of these variables were considered when possible.
The daily bivariate correlation results between stock price volatility,
PBV, MAPBV, and TTV indicated a generally negative relationship between stock
price volatility and block trading and a positive relationship between price
volatility and total trading volume. The multivariate daily results were
consistent with the bivariate results — when the block trading variable
entered early, it was negative while the total trading variable always entered
as a significant positive variable.
The bivariate correlations with monthly data indicated a negative relation-
ship between stock price volatility and the proportion of block trading. The
relationship between stock price volatility and the total number of shares
involved in block trades was mixed. Again, there was a positive relationship
between price volatility and total volume. Finally, the relationship with
interest rate volatility was mixed — the strongest relationships were negative
while the majority were positive. The multivariate results were consistent
because they likewise had a negative relation between price volatility and block
trading, a positive relationship with total trading volume and mixed results
with interest rate volatility.
Conclusion
The results strongly support the hypothesis that there is not a positive
relationship between stock price volatility and the proportion of block trading
as the absolute number of shares involved in block trades. In fact, all the
significant correlations indicate a negative relationship. This is consistent
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with the results derived by Griex and Albin for individual stocks [7],
There was some definite support for the belief that total trading volume has
a positive relationship with stock price volatility. Finally, the results
did not support the existence of a significant positive relationship between
stock price volatility and interest rate volatility.
Implications
The folklore that institutional trading causes an increase in the
volatility of stock prices is quite persuasive on Wall Street and elsewhere,
but has received very little empirical support. If anything, quite the opposite
has been shown. It appears that greater institutional trading in a stock or
in the stock market in general is associated with a lower level of stock price
volatility. Apparently, greater institutional involvement provides that much
needed characteristic of an efficient capital market — liquidity. Moreover,
as has been shown by Kraus and Stoll [10], when institutions trade, they do
not generally tend to trade in parallel as typically feared, but trade on both
sides of a market and, therefore, provide liquidity for one another.
Although there have been dramatic changes in our capital markets over the
past decade we continue to observe the ability of the participants to adapt to
the new environment. Our main concern should be to allow the markets to remain
free to adapt.
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Cl-Cl * Closing Price(t) minus Closing Price(t-l)/Closing Price(t-l)
Abs Cl-Cl « Absolute value of Cl-Cl.
Cl-Op = Closing Price(t) minus Opening Price (t) /Opening Price(t).
Abs Cl-Op = Absolute value of Cl-Op.
Hi-Lo High Price(t) minus Low Price(t)/Low Price(t)
PBV = Block trading volume during the period as a percent of total volume
on the NYSE.
MAPBV a yen day moving average of P3V.
TBV = Total block volume—i.e., total shares involved in block trades.
TTV » Total trading volume in millions tff shares.
IRV «= High interest rate minus Low interest rate/Low interest rate.
MIRV Average rate for last week in month t minus average rate for last
week in month t-1/average rate for last week in month t-1.
Abs MIRV » Absolute value of MIRV.
AIRV * Average interest rate in month t minus the average interest rate in
month t-1/average interest rate in month t-1.
Abs AIRV Absolute value of AIRV.

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DAILY DATA
VARIABLES: NOVEMBER 10, 1971-JUNE 14, 1974
22
Standard Coeff. of
Variable Mean Deviation
.00937
Vari
187
ation
Cl-Cl .G0005 .400
Abs Cl-Cl .00716 .00604 .844
CI-Op -.00026 .00803 - 30 .885
Abs Cl-Op .00614 .00517 .842
Hi-Lo .01907 .00515 .270
PBV .16567 .03629 .219
MAPBV .16569 .02069 .125
TTV 15.82522 3.55302 .225
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MONTHLY DATA
VARIABLES: DECEMBER, 1971-MAY, 1974
Standard Coeff. of
Variable Mean Deviation
.04097
Variation
117.057Cl-Cl .00035
Abs Cl-Cl .02847 .02898 1.018
Hi-Lo .06181 .03624 .586
PBV .16576 .01950 .118
TBV 2.62953 .43474 .165
TTV 15.43637 2.46147 .154
IRV .02427 .01945 .801
AIRV .00615 .03004 4.887
Abs AIRV .02288 .02000 .874
MIRV .00720 .03848 5 . 346
Abs MIRV .02728 .02765 1.014

TABLE 3
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN MEASURES OF
DAILY STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY, BLOCK TRADING
VOLUME, AND TOTAL TRADING VOLUME
NOVEMBER 10, 1971-JUNE 14, 1974 (6S4 OBSERVATIONS)
PBV MAPBV TTV
Cl-Cl ,062 -.012 .234
Abs Cl-Cl -.098 -.217 .167
Op-Cl .046 -.027 .120
Abs Op-Cl -.019 -.147 .121
Hi-Lo -.213 -.381 .336
TTV -.005 -.133 mm
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